Cyber Deception Architecture: Covert Attack Reconnaissance Using a Safe SDN Approach by Shimanaka, Toru et al.
Cyber Deception Architecture: Covert Attack Reconnaissance Using a Safe 
SDN Approach  
 
Toru Shimanaka 
Fujitsu System Integration 
Laboratories 
shimanaka.tohru@jp.fujitsu.com 
Ryusuke Masuoka 
Fujitsu System Integration 
Laboratories 
masuoka.ryusuke@jp.fujitsu.com 
Brian Hay 
Hume Center 
Virginia Tech 
brianhay@vt.edu
 
 
Abstract 
 
Significant valuable information can be 
determined by observing attackers in action. These 
observations provide significant insight into the 
attacker’s TTPs and motivations. It is challenging to 
continue observations when attackers breach 
operational networks. This paper describes a 
deception network methodology that redirects traffic 
from the compromised Operational Network (O-Net) 
to an identically configured Deception Network (D-
Net) minimizing any further compromise of 
operational data and assets, while also allowing the 
tactics, techniques, and procedures of the attacker to 
be studied. To keep the adversary oblivious to the 
transfer from the O-Net to the D-Net, we employ a 
sophisticated and unique packet rewriting technique 
using Software Defined Networking (SDN) 
technology that builds on two other strategies. This 
paper discusses the foundational strategies and 
introduces a new strategy that improves behavior for 
our described scenarios. We then provide some 
preliminary test results and suggest topics for further 
research.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
1.1. Background 
 
An adversary who conducts Advanced Persistent 
Threat (APT) cyber attacks is often a nation state or 
an organization backed by significant resources and 
with purposes beyond monetary gain (e.g. data theft, 
establishing long-term presence, etc.). As such, their 
attacks are targeted and very sophisticated. They are 
determined to penetrate the target’s well-protected 
networks and can maintain an undetected presence in 
the network for a long period of time [1]. In addition, 
they are likely to come back in, using alternate attack 
vectors, even if some (or all) of their previous 
activities are discovered and mitigated.  
They frequently follow the Cyber Kill Chain 
Methodology [2]; conducting an extensive survey of 
their target organization and developing malware or 
attack methodologies customized for the target’s 
environment before they start their attacks. Then the 
adversary uses spear phishing, watering holes, supply 
chain attacks, insiders, and/or other techniques to 
deliver their payload and build a beachhead inside the 
target’s network. When successful, a malicious 
backdoor program can be installed on one of the 
compromised devices in the network to build a 
remote operation environment connected to their 
external C2 (Command and Control) server. The 
adversary is then able to conduct reconnaissance on 
the compromised network to find additional targets 
and/or discover where sensitive information is stored, 
often moving laterally within the target environment 
to reach more strategic positions. During such time, 
the adversary generally takes steps to avoid detection 
and uses legitimate tools and commands as much as 
possible so that it is difficult to discern the 
adversary’s activities from legitimate ones. 
Depending on the overall objective, they might 
exfiltrate sensitive data and take actions to cover their 
tracks, leave false flags and indicators, or maintain 
their stealthy existence within the target network.  
Many cybersecurity textbooks and industry best-
practices dictate that when a compromised PC is 
discovered, it should be disconnected or quarantined 
from the network to prevent further damage. 
However, when dealing with APT attacks, this 
procedure is not always the best approach, as it often 
results in a loss of valuable information about the 
attack and the adversary. Even if you identify and 
stop the intrusion once, the adversary could learn 
from their failure and be very likely to come back 
again using more sophisticated tools and techniques 
which may be more challenging to detect. After 
detecting a suspected APT attack in progress, it can 
be used as an opportunity to apply cyber deception [3, 
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4] to obtain intelligence on the adversary, identify 
their TTPs, understand their purposes and intentions, 
and potentially, to keep them complacent with their 
current TTPs and delay the development and use of 
more sophisticated tools and tactics.  
 
1.2. Challenges 
 
Deploying cyber deception (vs. immediately 
shutting down an intrusion and patching the system), 
however, is a potentially dangerous reaction as we 
are allowing the adversary to continue the attack. In 
addition, the Cyber Deception campaign needs to be 
conducted covertly so that the adversary does not 
notice what is going on and alter behavior. When 
operating a Deception Network, it is important to 
both contain and observe the attack in real time and 
do so safely and covertly. More specifically, we need 
to accomplish the followings: 
 
1) Switch communications between the 
compromised host(s) and endpoints on the 
Operational Network to corresponding 
endpoints on the Deception Network without 
any adverse side effects. 
2) Maintain the session between the 
compromised host(s) and the C2 server out on 
the Internet through the process described in 
(1) above. 
3) Ensure that these defensive operations do not 
provide the adversary with observable effects 
that could alert them to the cyber deceptive 
activities. 
 
These are the challenges that this article and our 
technical solution address.  
 
1.3. Core Concept 
 
The most important objective of all is that the 
adversary does not notice that we are conducting a 
cyber deception operation. To achieve this, we 
deceive the adversary into believing they are 
maintaining control of the compromised host on the 
Operational Network (O-Net) from their command 
and control (C2) server. In addition, it should also 
appear to the adversary that they are communicating 
with the other network nodes (PCs and servers) on 
the O-Net, through the compromised host, without 
any observable differences in behavior during the 
changeover to the Deception Network (D-Net). This 
deception effect is accomplished by ensuring the D-
Net is configured nearly identically to the O-Net. 
(Figure 1). Once the adversary resides within the D-
Net, we can monitor all activity in a safe environment, 
allowing normal operations to continue on the O-Net.  
To achieve this effect, we employ Software Defined 
Networking (SDN) technologies (See Sec. 2 for 
details). Each O-Net subnet and the corresponding D-
Net subnet are connected through two OpenFlow 
switches as shown in Figure 1. We give the D-Net the 
same network configuration and each endpoint (e.g. 
workstations, servers, and routers) uses the same IP 
addresses, name, and roles/functions as the 
corresponding endpoint on the O-Net. The primary 
differences between the O-Net and the D-Net are (1) 
the MAC addresses of endpoints and, (2) there is 
only non-sensitive or fake information on the D-Net. 
Information accessed or stolen from the D-Net does 
not impact operations and may be selected or created 
so as to deliberately misinform the adversary. 
Whenever a compromise is detected on the O-Net, 
we start rewriting the packet information flowing 
between the compromised host and other endpoints 
on the O-Net, resulting in each flow being directed 
into the D-Net. As we do not know in advance which 
host may become compromised, it is necessary to 
Figure 1. Allow the adversary uninterrupted remote-control of the compromised PC from the C2 server 
while transferring the network activities of the compromised PC from the O-Net to the D-Net  
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rewrite packets dynamically. For that purpose, we 
picked Software Defined Networking (SDN) 
technology, specifically OpenFlow-enabled switches 
and a corresponding OpenFlow controller (Ryu). 
Flow tables of OpenFlow are used extensively to 
match and process packets to enable necessary packet 
rewriting.  
When rewriting packets using flow tables to deceive 
the adversary, we must consider a few objectives. 
Communications between the compromised hosts and 
the endpoints on the O-Net need to be switched to 
ones the corresponding D-Net hosts without any 
noticeable effect. In addition, communication 
between the compromised host and the C2 server 
outside of the target’s organization needs to continue 
uninterrupted. With the naive “match packet IP 
address, then rewrite its MAC address” (strategy #1), 
you can transfer UDP packets from the O-Net to the 
D-Net, but TCP communication cannot be 
established as the ARP information on the endpoint 
on D-Net does not get updated. Since TCP 
communication fails to establish, strategy #1 is not an 
acceptable strategy.  
With “match packet MAC address and ARP packets, 
then rewrite its MAC information” (strategy #2), this 
enables TCP communication within the O-Net subnet 
and the D-Net subnet where the compromised host 
resides. However, it cannot sustain communications 
between the compromised host and both the C2 
server and the other D-Net subnets at the same time. 
This is because the packets to the C2 server and the 
packets to the other D-Net subnets require them to be 
sent through the different routers respectively.  
To fully achieve our goals, strategy #3, which 
employs both strategy #2 and the new “match packet 
network IP address, then switch port accordingly”, is 
utilized. This allows for TCP communications 
between  the compromised host and the O-Net to be 
transferred to the D-Net without noticeable effects 
and allows for TCP communications between the 
compromised host and the C2 server to continue 
uninterrupted. Table 1 summarizes the three 
strategies. 
 
1.4. Structure of this paper 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 provides a brief introduction to SDN and 
OpenFlow. Section 3 describes work related to this 
research. Section 4 describes the architecture and 
implementation of the proposed deception technique. 
Section 5 describes evaluation results of the proposed 
technique. Section 6 concludes the paper and 
provides some avenues for future research. 
 
Table 1 . Packet rewriting strategies 
Strategy Description Comments 
#1 match packet IP 
address, then 
rewrite its MAC 
address 
Naive, works only 
for UDP packets 
#2 match packet 
MAC address 
and ARP 
packets, then 
rewrite its MAC 
information 
Works for TCP 
within the subnets, 
but not for comm. 
with both the C2 
servers and other D-
Net subnets at the 
same time 
#3 strategy #2 + 
match packet 
network IP 
address, then 
switch port 
accordingly 
This solution works 
for all internal and 
external 
communications  
 
2. SDN and OpenFlow 
 
Software Defined Networking (SDN) is an 
architecture that dynamically controls the network 
with software. OpenFlow [5] is one of the SDN 
implementations, and its standardization is advanced 
by the Open Network Foundation (ONF). OpenFlow 
has the following features: 
 
1) Separation of control plane and data plane 
There are two functions for switches: to 
communicate with other switches to determine 
how network traffic should be forwarded; and to 
then actually forward (or drop) packets 
accordingly. The former occurs in the control 
plane, and the latter in the data plane. For legacy 
switches, those two functions happen in the same 
place, namely within the switch. For OpenFlow, 
those two planes are separated with the control 
plane activities being moved to an external 
OpenFlow Controller, which dictates traffic 
forwarding rules to the switch in the form of flow 
table entries. The data plane remains on the 
switch and utilizes the controller-provided flow 
tables to make the necessary forwarding decisions.  
2) Flexible packet processing  
Flow tables enable flexible packet processing. 
The OpenFlow Controller adds, removes, or 
modifies entries in the flow tables of its 
associated switches. These rules can not only 
cause the switch to forward or drop packets, but 
also result in packets that are rewritten on the fly 
or sent to a specific set of output ports. The 
rule(s) applied to a given packet are selected 
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based on matching fields between the rule and 
incoming packet.  
 
In this research, we created an OpenFlow controller 
using the Ryu [6] framework. In addition, we 
implemented a REST API to configure the flow 
tables using Northbound APIs of the OpenFlow 
Controller. (Northbound APIs are APIs to control an 
OpenFlow Controller from an application.) We used 
the Open vSwitch [7] as our OpenFlow switch 
implementation, although the techniques are not 
specific to that particular switch and could be applied 
to a variety of other OpenFlow enabled devices. 
 
3. Related work 
 
There have been several attempts to covertly 
observe cyber attacks before. We describe four major 
approaches and compare them with our approach: 
 
3.1. Sandbox 
 
A sandbox such as Cuckoo [8] is a type of malicious 
software analysis system. It simulates physical 
operating systems in a virtual environment. The 
sandbox executes or opens potentially malicious 
artifacts (ex. codes and documents) in an isolated 
environment and observes the resulting behavior of 
the system. This approach can be effective at 
observing the types of activity applied in the 
exploitation stage of the kill chain, but are less useful 
if one wants to observe advanced post-compromise 
activity such as lateral movement and practically no 
use to understand adversary’s intentions. Sandboxes 
do have limitations, which include anti-sandboxing 
mechanisms in malware itself (e.g., timeouts before 
malicious activity begins, detection of system 
artifacts that are typically found in sandboxes, and 
detection of human behavior or recent activity which 
is often absent in sandboxes) [9]. Our focus is to 
observe how a human adversary performs his/her 
attack after a successful malware infection and has 
established a beachhead.  
 
3.2. Honeypot 
 
A honeypot is a decoy computer system designed to 
look like a legitimate system an adversary will want 
to break into while, unbeknownst to the adversary, 
they are being covertly observed [10]. A honeypot is 
generally deployed on the perimeter of the 
organization’s network such as an Internet facing 
server. They can also be placed throughout an 
organization’s network, but it requires the adversary 
to be lured to the honeypot through the Operational 
Network (O-Net), and it can be a dangerous and 
high-risk process. We transfer the attack to the 
Deception Network (D-Net), which is a type of high-
interaction honeypot within the organization as soon 
as a compromise on one of endpoints is detected. 
This does not require luring the adversary through the 
O-Net and the adversary cannot access the O-Net 
once the attack is contained within the D-Net.  
 
3.3. Moving Target Defense (MTD) 
 
Vincent E. Urias et al. proposed the Moving Target 
Defense (MTD), whose aim is to increase attack 
difficulty [11] by dynamically changing the targeted 
network. This method differs from our purpose of 
observing attacks safely and covertly. Though they 
prepare the Deception Network (D-Net) with the 
same configuration as the Operational Network (O-
Net) to contain the attack, they create the O-Net in a 
fully realized virtual environment. Our architecture 
consists of an O-Net consisting of actual physical 
PCs, servers and network equipment and the D-Net 
built in a virtual environment. Although we usually 
use a D-Net in a virtual environment, the D-Net can 
be physical as well. 
 
3.4. Deception on Operational Networks 
 
Recent cyber deception technologies are interwoven 
directly into the Operational Networks (O-Nets) for 
detection, diversion, resource depletion, uncertainty, 
and intelligence purposes.  
Reconnaissance Deception System (RDS) was 
proposed in [12] to delay or thwart malicious 
network reconnaissance. This is done through 
providing the adversary a different virtual network 
view at the assignment of a new DHCP lease by 
virtually blowing up a single subnet into a multitude 
of virtual subnets with hosts on the original subnet 
scattered randomly among them along with 
honeypots. The network topology can appear 
different for the adversary every time the new virtual 
network view is provided. This is confusing, but not 
stealthy nor fit for our intelligence purpose. From the 
technical perspective, its deception happens within 
the scope of a single subnet and does not involve 
more sophisticated packet rewriting strategies like 
strategy #3 in Table 1. 
Shadow Networks [13, 14] is a solution that 
leverages the advantages of both low- and high-
interaction honeypots. It projects (connects through 
virtual switches) many low-interaction honeypots 
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Figure 2. O-Net, D-Net, and Deception 
Management Network 
onto the O-Net. When an attacker probes into one of 
low-interaction honeypots, a high-interaction 
honeypot can be swapped in to take its place. When a 
connection is attempted from the one of the 
honeypots to a physical computer, a host emulator 
can step in to take the place of the physical computer. 
In this system, SDN is used to prevent collisions 
between the duplicated IP addresses. To realize this, 
Shadow Networks changes the destination to another 
one within the O-Net (likely within the same subnet) 
through relatively straight-forward packet 
manipulations and does not involve more 
sophisticated packet rewriting strategies like strategy 
#3 in Table 1. 
 
4. Architecture and Implementation 
 
We propose a Cyber Deception Architecture 
consisting of a network configuration and an attack 
transferring mechanism to transfer network 
communications from the O-Net to the D-Net, using 
the OpenFlow technologies. In this section, we 
describe its architecture, with a focus on how the 
transfer mechanism is implemented by using 
OpenFlow.  
 
4.1. Network Configuration  
 
Figure 2 shows an example network configuration 
we use to illustrate our architecture in this paper. The 
two primary components of our architecture are an 
Operational Network (O-Net) and a Deception 
Network (D-Net) configured to be identical to the O-
Net. For our research, we typically use a physical O-
Net and a virtual D-Net that uses a single physical 
server. However, our proposed technique would be 
extendable to any combination of a 
physical/virtual/hybrid O-Net and a 
physical/virtual/hybrid D-Net. To control the 
operation, there is also a Deception Management 
Network. 
To avoid alerting the adversary that the attack has 
been transferred from the O-Net to the D-Net, each 
endpoint on the D-Net has the same IP address as the 
corresponding endpoint on the O-Net.  
The O-Net has an OpenFlow switch as an access 
switch for each subnet. The O-Net connects to the 
corresponding subnet on the D-Net through the 
OpenFlow switch and the corresponding OpenFlow 
switch on the D-Net. Initially, the flow tables of the 
two OpenFlow switches are set to block any 
communication between the O-Net and the D-net.  
 
4.2. Attack Transfer Mechanism 
 
The deception operation of the attack transfer is 
performed by the Deception Controller on the 
Deception Management Network, by controlling the 
OpenFlow Controller, which, in turn, controls the 
OpenFlow Switches. The Attack Transferring 
Mechanism uses the steps shown in Figure 3 to 
facilitate a safe and covert attack transfer. Each step 
is described in detail in the following section. 
 
0) Detect a Compromise. [This step is out of 
scope of this paper] As an example, the Log 
Search Engine detects a compromise on the O-
Net through an adversary’s access of a decoy file. 
The Log Search Engine then sends a 
compromise alert to the Deception Controller.  
1) Prepare D-Net. Upon receiving the compromise 
alert, the Deception Controller creates and 
executes a script to (Step 2) instruct the 
hypervisor to turn off the shadow (corresponding 
endpoint on the D-Net) of the compromised PC, 
and (Step 3) instruct the OpenFlow Controller 
using the REST API to set the flow tables to the 
OpenFlow Switches to transfer the 
Figure 3. Attack Transfer Mechanism 
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communications of the compromised PC to the 
D-Net.  
2) Shutdown Shadow. When instructed by the 
Deception Controller, the hypervisor turns off 
the shadow of the compromised PC on the D-Net. 
This step is necessary because the compromised 
PC transferred to the D-Net, not its shadow, 
interacts with other endpoints on the D-Net. 
3) Create Flow Tables. When instructed by the 
Deception Controller, the OpenFlow Controller 
sets the flow tables customized for each 
OpenFlow Switch to match, rewrite, and change 
the output ports of, packets.  
4) Manipulate Packets. The OpenFlow Switches 
stores the flow tables provided by the OpenFlow 
Controller and starts matching, rewriting, and 
changing the output ports of, packets 
accordingly.  
 
After the completion of these steps, the OpenFlow 
switches work in coordination to transfer the 
communications between the compromised PC and 
the O-Net to the ones between the compromised PC 
and the D-Net while the session between the 
compromised PC and the C2 server is maintained. 
The following section describes the packet 
manipulation by the flow tables used to achieve this. 
 
4.3. Packet Manipulation by the Flow Tables  
 
We implement our sophisticated and unique packet 
rewriting strategy #3 (Table 1) using the flow tables. 
Figure 4. Packet Manipulation by the Flow Tables 
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As a reminder, strategy #3 is “match packet MAC 
address and ARP packets, then rewrite its MAC 
information” and “match packet network IP address, 
then switch port accordingly” combined. There are 
three separate packet manipulations in the strategy #3.  
  
A) Match ARP packets, then rewrite their MAC 
information and change output ports 
B) Match packets by their MAC addresses, then 
rewrite the packet MAC addresses and change 
output ports 
C) Match packets by their network IP addresses, 
then switch output ports accordingly  
 
As mentioned in the Introduction, manipulation (A) 
is necessary. ARP packets need to be rewritten to 
ensure that TCP communications between the 
compromised PC and the endpoint on the D-Net are 
established. This is essential as ARP is used to 
associate the MAC address with the IP address. 
When an endpoint X on the D-Net attempts to send a 
packet to the IP address of the compromised PC, X 
uses an ARP request packet to determine the MAC 
address for the compromised PC’s IP address. The 
ARP request packet reaches the compromised PC, 
but the ARP response packet will be sent to the 
endpoint on the O-Net corresponding to X. Therefore, 
X will never find the MAC address of the 
compromised PC, failing to communicate to the 
compromised PC. When the ARP packets, including 
the ARP response packets from the compromised PC, 
are rewritten as in (A), X can determine the MAC 
address of the compromised PC.  
With manipulation (B) along with (A), packets 
to/from the compromised PC are sent to/from the 
endpoints on the D-Net, thus the communications of 
the compromised PC are successfully transferred 
from the O-Net to the D-Net.  
However, to ensure that communications of the 
compromised PC beyond the subnet of the O-Net and 
the corresponding D-Net subnet work correctly, 
manipulation (C) is necessary. Without (C), the 
communication between the compromised PC and 
the C2 server, hosted outside the network and the 
communication between the compromised PC and 
other subnets could not be maintained simultaneously. 
This is due to the fact that the router for the 
communication of the compromised PC to/from the 
C2 server and the router for the communications of 
the compromised PC to/from the endpoints on the 
other subnets on the D-Net are different. With (C), 
the packet is sent out from the appropriate port 
depending on the network IP address of the packet.  
Figure 4 shows in detail how the mechanism 
(deception architecture) works in the following 
subsections. At the top of figure 4 are the subnets 
(Network-2 of the O-Net and D-Net), PC-21, PC-22, 
PC-23, and PC-24 on the subnet Network-2 of the O-
Net. Router-1, and PC-11 on the subnet Network-1 of 
the O-Net. PC-22 is the compromised PC. There is a 
C2 server operated by the adversary somewhere on 
the Internet. The OpenFlow Switch-21 is the access 
switch of the subnet Network-2. An endpoint on the 
D-Net has the same name as the corresponding 
endpoint on the O-Net. (We use ’ in this paragraph as 
a substitute for “shadow” to represent the D-Net 
version of an O-Net endpoint.) Therefore, there are 
PC-21’, PC-23’, and PC-24’ on subnet Network-2’ of 
the D-Net. Router-1’, and PC-11’ on the subnet 
Network-1’ of the D-Net. The OpenFlow Switch-22 
bridges the subnet Network-2 and the subnet 
Network-2’. PC-22’, the shadow of the compromised 
PC-22, has already been removed by the Deception 
Controller and the hypervisor before this transfer 
process is initiated. 
 
4.3.1 ARP from the compromised PC 
 
To make the compromised PC-22 logically belong 
to the D-Net, ARP request and ARP reply packets 
from the compromised PC are rewritten. The 
destination MAC address in the Ether header and the 
destination MAC address (Target Hardware Address) 
of the ARP are rewritten from the MAC address of 
the endpoint on the O-Net to the MAC address of its 
shadow (the corresponding endpoint) on the D-Net. 
The output port for the packet is changed to the one 
for the OpenFlow Switch-22. 
 
4.3.2 ARP to the compromised PC 
 
Corresponding to Section 4.3.1, we also need to 
control the ARP packets sent from the D-Net's 
endpoint as if the compromised PC is on the same 
subnet. The source MAC address in the Ether header 
and the source MAC address (Sender Hardware 
Figure 5. Rewriting an ARP Reply from PC-21 
(shadow) to the compromised PC-22 
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Address) of the ARP (see Figure 5) addressed to the 
compromised PC-22 from an endpoint on the D-Net 
are rewritten to the MAC address of the 
corresponding endpoint on the O-Net. The output 
port for the packet is changed to the one for the 
OpenFlow Switch-21. 
 
4.3.3 Packet from the compromised PC 
 
The ARP tables of the endpoints on the O-Net and 
D-Net are bridged coherently through the activity 
described in Section 4.3.1. To send a packet other 
than ARP, the destination MAC address in the Ether 
header of the packet is rewritten to the MAC address 
of the shadow on the D-Net. The output port for the 
packet is changed to the OpenFlow Switch-22. Since 
the priority of the flow tables for this operation is 
lower than the flow tables for rewriting the ARP 
packet, this applies to packets other than ARP. 
Broadcast packets from the compromised PC-22 
must be sent to the endpoints on the D-Net instead of 
those on the O-Net. To achieve this, we use the 
OpenFlow Group function. Broadcast packets from 
PC-22 are sent to the group that combines the 
connection port of PC-22 and the output port of 
OpenFlow Switch-22. With this configuration, 
broadcast packets are sent only to the endpoints on 
the D-Net. 
 
4.3.4 Packet to the compromised PC 
 
As discussed in Section 4.3.3, packets from the 
endpoints on the D-Net PC need to be rewritten so 
that the compromised PC appears to be on the same 
subnet. The source MAC address in the Ether header 
addressed to the compromised PC-22 from the 
endpoint on the D-Net is rewritten to the MAC 
address of the corresponding endpoint on the O-Net. 
The output port for the packet is changed to the one 
for OpenFlow Switch-21. In addition, we need to 
forward broadcast packets from the endpoint on the 
same subnet of the D-Net to the compromised PC-22. 
By sending this packet to the group described in 
Section 4.3.3, these broadcast packets reach only PC-
22 on the O-Net and no other endpoints on the O-Net. 
 
4.3.5 Maintaining the connection with C2 server 
 
To maintain the connection between the 
compromised PC and the C2 server out on the 
Internet, the packets going out to the C2 server (and 
other endpoints outside of the corporate network) 
need to be handled differently from the packets going 
to the other subnets within the corporate network. For 
this purpose, the destination MAC address of the 
packet from the compromised PC-22 addressed to 
another subnet within the corporate network is 
rewritten to the MAC address of the Router-1 
(shadow) on the D-Net and the output port is changed 
to the one for OpenFlow Switch-22. The source 
MAC address of Router-1 (shadow) in the Ether 
header of the packets form another D-Net subnet is 
rewritten to the MAC address of Router-1 of the O-
Net and the output port is changed to the one for 
OpenFlow Switch-21.  
No changes are required for the packets between 
the compromised PC and the C2 server and all 
communication between them continue uninterrupted 
through Router-1.  
 
5. Evaluation 
 
5.1. Strategies #1 and #2 Tests 
 
We confirmed the network behaviors of strategies 
#1 and #2 in Table 1. For strategy #1, we used a 
simple setup of three PCs connected to an OpenFlow 
switch in a virtualized environment. The TCP 
communication attempts between the compromised 
PC and the endpoint on the D-Net were not 
successfully established due to the lack of ARP 
packet rewriting.  
For strategy #2, we used a smaller version of the 
environment as described in Subsection 5.2. 
Communications between the compromised PC and 
the endpoints on the D-Net were observed to be 
working properly. Even though communications 
between the compromised PC and the C2 server out 
on the Internet were maintained, the communications 
to the endpoints on other subnets of the O-Net failed 
to be transferred to the corresponding subnets of the 
D-Net. Instead, the latter communication was sent to 
the subnets of the O-Net. This is not a desirable result 
and introduces additional risk to the O-Net. 
 
5.2. Test Methodology 
 
To test our solution (strategy #3), two servers were 
connected by a switch. One server provides a 
virtualized environment for the O-Net (including 
OpenFlow Switches) and the C2 server on the 
Internet, and another server provides a virtualized 
environment for the D-Net (including OpenFlow 
Switches) and the Deception Management Network. 
Both the O-Net and the D-Net have six subnets and 
31 endpoints as shown in Figure 6. 
For purposes of evaluation, attacks were conducted 
on the compromised PC from the C2 server. We 
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observed from the adversary’s point of view (i.e. 
from the C2 server) to try to identify any differences 
detected before and after the attack transfer from the 
O-Net to the D-Net. In addition, we watched other 
negative triggers (like session termination) during the 
transfer.  
We automated the following post-compromise 
activities selected from common attacks and let the 
sequence run on the compromised PC from the C2 
server's console before and after the transfer. The 
script consists primarily of network-related 
commands. 
 
1) sysinfo: Get system and user information 
2) idletime: Get the time since user’s last operation 
3) getpid: Get the process ID of the current attack 
process 
4) ps: List current processes 
5) post/windows/gather/enum_services: Get names 
and configuration info of services 
6) getproxy: Get information about proxy 
7) post/windows/gather/credentials/enum_cred_sto
re: Get credentials of IE 
8) post/multi/gather/thunderbird_creds: Get 
credentials of Thunderbird 
9) ls -lR C:\\Users\\: List the users 
10) post/windows/gather/enum_ie: Get IE browser 
history 
11) post/windows/gather/dumplinks2: List files 
recently used 
12) post/windows/gather/enum_applications: List 
installed applications 
13) net user / net localgroup: Get information about 
local accounts, groups and administrators 
14) net share: Get shared folder information 
15) show_mount: List currently attached mounts 
16) ifconfig: Get network interface information 
(MAC address, IP address) 
17) arp: Get the ARP table 
18) route: Get the routing table 
19) netstat: Get connection information 
20) net use: Get SMB remote connection 
information 
21) post/windows/recon/computer_browser_discove
ry: List neighbor computers 
 
5.3. Evaluation result 
 
From the adversarial perspective (both on the 
compromised host and on the C2 server) the 
automated attack script in Section 5.2 produced 
identical results before and after the transfer from the 
O-Net to the D-Net. The session between the 
compromised PC and the C2 server remained 
uninterrupted during and after the transfer. In 
addition, no negative triggers were observed. Figure 
7 shows the shortened output of the script. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
[*] ifconfig 
 
Interface 12 
============ 
Name         : vmxnet3 Ethernet Adapter 
Hardware MAC : 00:50:56:a5:04:e7 
MTU          : 1500 
IPv4 Address : 10.10.22.102 
IPv4 Netmask : 255.255.255.0 
IPv6 Address : fe80::84f4:5832:cee4:1469 
IPv6 Netmask : ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:: 
 
[*] arp 
 
ARP cache 
========= 
 
    IP address       MAC address        Interface 
    ----------       -----------        --------- 
    10.10.22.1       00:50:56:a5:72:73  12 
    10.10.22.101     00:50:56:a5:61:6c  12 
    10.10.22.103     00:50:56:a5:20:29  12 
    10.10.22.104     00:50:56:a5:2c:a7  12 
    10.10.22.201     00:50:56:a5:0d:69  12 
    10.10.22.255     ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff  12 
    224.0.0.22       00:00:00:00:00:00  1 
    224.0.0.22       01:00:5e:00:00:16  12 
    224.0.0.252      01:00:5e:00:00:fc  12 
    239.255.255.250  00:00:00:00:00:00  1 
    239.255.255.250  01:00:5e:7f:ff:fa  12 
    255.255.255.255  ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff  12 
 
 ~~~ 
[*] net use 
[+] Net use list 
 
Status  Local  Remote 
------  -----  ------ 
        D:     \\sh201\share 
OK      M:     \\file\share\topsecret 
 
 
[*] post/windows/recon/computer_browser_discovery 
[+] Found 4 systems. 
.... 
[*] Netdiscovery Results 
==================== 
 
  TYPE     IP            COMPUTER NAME  VERSION  COMMENT 
  ----     --            -------------  -------  ------- 
  0x11003  10.10.22.102  KG201          6.1       
  0x11003  10.10.22.104  YM201          6.3       
  0x31003  10.10.22.103  KI201          6.3       
  0x51003  10.10.22.101  UN201          6.1       
 
meterpreter >  
Figure 7. Logs collected by adversary 
Figure 6. Evaluation Environment 
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Our objective is to contain and observe an APT-like 
attack safely and covertly so that we can monitor 
adversarial behavior in real time to understand their 
TTPs, purposes, and intentions. To achieve this 
objective, we propose creating and deploying a 
Deception Network (D-Net) with the same network 
topology and endpoints, using the same IP addresses 
of the corresponding endpoints on the Operational 
Network (O-Net). When we detect a compromise on 
the O-Net, we transfer the communications between 
the compromised PC and the O-Net endpoints to the 
ones between the compromised PC and the D-Net 
while keeping the communications between the 
compromised PC and the C2 server intact. That is 
achieved by using OpenFlow's flow tables for 
matching and rewriting packets. We have confirmed 
that we can contain the compromised PC without the 
adversary observing any difference before and after 
the cyber deception and that the session remained 
intact during and after the transfer. 
The focus of the paper, the attack transferring 
mechanism through SDN is important but is still just 
one piece of the whole Cyber Deception puzzle and it 
needs to be incorporated into the entire cyber 
deception operation. We have combined the 
mechanism with carefully crafted honey tokens on O-
Net and intelligence gathering in D-Net so that as 
soon as the attacker touches a honey token, it triggers 
the attack-transferring mechanism automatically, 
leading to endpoint and network intelligence 
gathering on D-Net. We tested this system in cyber 
war games and it worked seamlessly and successfully 
deceived the red team for many hours until the game 
ended. 
For future research and analysis, we will continue 
our empirical evaluations of the technology and work 
to develop scientific and objective evaluation 
methods, to continue to refine the technology. For 
technology refinement, we plan to implement and 
evaluate our cyber deception architecture for IPv6 
using our already implemented Northbound API for 
matching and rewriting the Neighbor Discovery 
Protocol (NDP) of IPv6, the ARP equivalent of IPv4.  
Potential flaws revealing the deception include 
network latency changes and server content 
continuity before and after the switch from the O-Net 
to the D-Net. In follow-on research, we will test 
network latency changes in various real and 
virtualized configurations. In more and more 
virtualized operational networks, however, network 
latency may not provide significant clues for the 
adversary to determine if he or she is in a deceptive 
environment or not. Server content continuity is an 
important consideration in balancing maintenance 
and other costs, and realism of the deceptive 
environment and would require innovative solutions, 
which is a focus on our follow-on research. 
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